现代电力 ›› 2020, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (4): 376-384.doi: 10.19725/j.cnki.1007-2322.2020.0119

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基于博弈论的虚拟电厂电源优化配置

侯晨佳1, 梁海宁2, 赵冬梅1   

  1. 1.华北电力大学 电气与电子工程学院,北京市 昌平区 102206;
    2.杭州华电半山发电有限公司,浙江省 杭州市 310015
  • 收稿日期:2020-03-16 出版日期:2020-08-10 发布日期:2020-08-07
  • 作者简介:侯晨佳(1995),女,通信作者,硕士研究生,主要研究方向:博弈论和虚拟电厂,E-mail:ncepucd1201hcj@163.com;梁海宁(1973),男,高级工程师,长期从事电力企业生产经营管理工作;赵冬梅(1965),女,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向:电力系统分析与控制、新能源发电与智能电网,E-mail:zhao-dm@ncepu.edu.cn

Game Theory Based Optimization Allocation of Generators in Virtual Power Plant

HOU Chenjia1, LIANG Haining2, ZHAO Dongmei1   

  1. 1. School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Changping District, Beijing 102206, China;
    2. Hangzhou Huadian Banshan Power Generation Co., Ltd. Hangzhou 310015,Zhejing Province,China
  • Received:2020-03-16 Online:2020-08-10 Published:2020-08-07

摘要: 随着国家政策的鼓励支持,大量分布式发电资源并入电网是大势所趋。单一分布式发电资源受出力的不确定性导致其并网的局限性,虚拟电厂利用多电源集群互补效应能够有效缓解这一问题。利用博弈论对虚拟电厂电源进行配置,分析风、光、燃、储电源投资商在各种合作模式与非合作模式下的装机情况,对合作模式各参与者收益进行分配。考虑多人博弈下博弈模型更为复杂,可能出现个体理性和整体理性不一致导致整体收益欠佳,结合电源装机占比、参与者风险偏好系数对Shapley值分配方法进行改进,最后通过算例验证所提方法的有效性。

关键词: 虚拟电厂, 分布式电源, 优化配置, 博弈论, 收益分配, 改进Shapley值法

Abstract: Along with the encouragement and support from national policy, it is a general trend that a large amount of distributed power generation resources are being grid-connected to power grids. The uncertainty of power output of single distributed power plant leads to the limitation of grid-connection of single distributed power plants, and this problem could be effectively remitted by virtual power plant utilizing cluster complementary effect between multiple power sources. By use of game theory the generators in virtual plants were configured, and the installed conditions of investors in different power generation ways such as wind power generation, PV power generation, fossil fuel power generation and so on under various cooperative modes and non-cooperative modes were analyzed to allocate the revenue among the participants of the cooperative modes. It was considered that the game model might be more complex under N-person game, and it was possible to appear the situation that the individual reason was not inconsistent with the entire reason, thus it led to the overall revenue not too enough, so combining with the installed power supply ratio and the participants’ risk preference coefficients the Shapley value distribution method was improved. The effectiveness of the proposed method is verified by simulation results

Key words: virtual power plant, distributed generations, optimal allocation, game theory, profit allocation, improved Shapley value method

中图分类号: 

  • TM73